Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

State of Utah v. Travis Johnston and Amber Barrick
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Aldrich Nelson Weight and Esplin; Counsel for Appellant.
Christopher D. Ballard; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Matthew
P. Jube; Counsel for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Johnston, No. 20010027 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3084

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20010027-CA

vs.
Priority No. 2
TRAVIS JOHNSTON and
AMBER BARRICK,
Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, FROM A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED
FORGERY, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS

MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
APPEALS DIVISION
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Counsel for Appellee

MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766)
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
F|LED
Telephone: (801) 373-490&h Court of Appeals
Counsel for Appellant

NOV 0 2 2001
PauteUe Stagg

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20010027-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee.
vs.

Priority No. 2
TRAVIS JOHNSTON and
AMBER BARRICK,
Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, FROM A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED
FORGERY, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS

MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
APPEALS DIVISION
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Counsel for Appellee

MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766)
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: (801) 373-4912
Counsel for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

CONTROLLING

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

Nature of the Case

2

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

2

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3

ARGUMENT

4

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT
APPELLANTS' ACTIONS LEGALLY CONSTITUTED THE
OF OFFENSE OF FORGERY

4

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

6

ADDENDA

7

Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Exhibit #1
Transcript of May 8, 2000, hearing

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutory- Provisions
Utah Code Annotated § 70A-1-201(5)

4

Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-104

4

Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-109(l)(b)

4

Utah Code .Annotated § 76-6-407

3. 6

Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501

1-4

Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e)

1

Cases Cited
Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., Ill P.2d 697 (Utah 1986)

4

State v. Donaldson, 385 P.2d 151 (Utah 1963)

5

State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998)

1

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20010027-CA
vs.
TRAVIS JOHNSTON and
AMBER BARRICK,

Priority No. 2

Defendants/Appellants.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in its conclusions that appellants' actions legally

constituted the offense of forgery as defined by Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501. This
issue presents this Court with a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v.
Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). This issue was raised in appellants' oral motion to
dismiss (R. 139).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Travis Johnston and Amber Barrick appeal from the judgment, sentence and

commitment of the Fourth District Court after the entry of conditional pleas to the charge
of attempted forgery, a class A misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Travis Johnston and Amber Barrick were charged by information filed in Fourth

District Court on or about December 27, 1999, with Forgery, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501 (R.l, 61).
On May 8, 2000, a hearing was held before the Honorable Lynn W. Davis (R. 13,
74, 139, 140). At the hearing appellants made an oral motion to dismiss claiming that
appellants actions in this case did not constitute a forgery (R. 139). After taking the
matter under advisement, Judge Davis issued a written ruling denying appellants motion
to dismiss (R. 14-15, 77-78). On July 3, 2000, Johnston and Barrick entered pleas of
guily to the charge of attempted forgery, class A misdemeanors, conditioned upon their
right to appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss (R. 27-28, 96-97, 125).
On November 20, 2000, Johnston and Barrick were sentenced to 24 months court
probation and ordered each of them to serve 14 days in the Utah County Jail's work
diversion program, to pay a fine in the amount of $740.00, and $33.59 in restitution (R.
105-07, 44-46). On December 14, 2000, appellants made application to the Fourth
District Court for a certificate of probable cause (R. 47, 108). On December 15, 2000,
Judge Davis granted the certificate (R. 51, 58, 112, 119).

2

On December 19, 2000, Johnston and Barrick filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth
District Court (R. 60, 121). On January 25, 2001, this Court order the appeals
consolidated (R. 132, 138).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Appellants found a money order in Provo which was made payable in the amount
of $33.59. The "pay to order" line of the money order had been left blank. Appellants,
who had recently become engaged to be married, were short on money so they filled
Barrick's name in on the pay to order line, endorsed the back of the money order with her
name and then cashed the money order in Provo. (R. 139 at 4, Exhibit #1).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants assert that the filling in of a payee's name on a money order that does
not name a payee and the cashing of said money order is not an act of forgery because the
action does not change the legal significance of the document nor does it constitute the
completion or utterance of a writing purporting to be the act of another as required by
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501. Appellants assert that their actions, at best, constitute
theft of lost or mislaid property, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 76-6-407.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT
APPELLANTS' ACTIONS LEGALLY CONSTITUTED THE
OF OFFENSE OF FORGERY
Appellants assert that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the actions of
appellants in filling in Barrick's name on the pay to order line and in endorsing the
money order before cashing it constitutes the offense of forgery under Utah Code
Annotated § 76-6-501. In order to convict appellants of forgery, the State had to prove
that they completed a writing—in this case a money order—so that the completion purports
to be the act of another.
A money order-like a check-is a negotiable instrument. See Utah Code
Annotated § 70A-3-104. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code states that a promise or
order to pay in a negotiable instrument can be made payable to either a named individual
or to any bearer and that a promise or order is payable to the bearer if it "does not state a
payee." Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-109(l)(b). Utah Code Annotated § 70A-1-201(5)
defines "bearer" as "the person in possession of an instrument... payable to bearer or
indorsed in blank."
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the Uniform Commercial Code defines
a negotiable instrument from four criteria: "Specifically, it must (1) evidence a signature
by the maker or drawer, (2) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money, (3) be payable on demand or at a definite time, and (4) be payable to
order or to bearer." Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., Ill P.2d 697 (Utah 1986). Appellants
assert that when they found the money order, it was already a completed negotiable
instrument. One, the money order was signed by the maker. Two, the money order
4

contained an unconditional promise to pay aum certain in money. Three, the money
order was payable on demand. Four, the money order was payable to the bearerappellants-because it did not state a payee. Accordingly, Judge Davis' conclusion that
the money order was not complete until Barrick's name was filled in as payee is
erroneous because the money order was already a completed writing or negotiable
instrument which was payable to them as bearer prior to their act of writing Barrick's
name on the money order as payee.
In State v. Donaldson, 385 P.2d 151 (Utah 1963), a case in which a defendant was
convicted of issuing a bad check, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the instrument the
defendant had issued was, indeed, a negotiable instrument even though the defendant had
not named an identifiable payee. The Court stated: "It is well settled by authority that the
omission to insert in an instrument the name of a payee is not a feature or a defect which
affects negotiability. The effect of the omission to name a payee is to invest any bona
fide holder with the authority to fill in the blank left for that purpose by the drawer or
maker. Such instruments are payable to the bearer until restricted in their currency as
negotiable instruments by the insertion of the name of some particular payee." 385 P.2d
at 151-52.
Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, the money order uttered by appellants
was a complete negotiable instrument payable to any bearer. Appellants, in inserting
Barrick's name in the pay to order line, did not complete the money order. Rather by
leaving the money order blank as to payee, the maker had already completed the writing
and made the money order payable to any bearer-including appellants-and therefore no
action was taken by appellants which purported to be the act of the maker because the
money order was already payable to them as bearers.
5

Admittedly, when appellants found the money order they reasonably knew that it
had been lost. In addition, appellants made no reasonable effort to return the money
order to the maker and evidenced an intent to deprive the maker of funds represented by
the money order. Under these facts, appellants are probably guilty of theft of lost or
mislaid property under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-407. Appellants assert, however,
that they are not guilty of forgery because they did not complete a writing purporting to
be the act of another.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Johnston and Barrick ask that this Court reverse their
convictions of attempted forgery, class A misdemeanors, .
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ day of November, 2001.

O

Margaret IVLindsay
Counsel fdr Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, t h i s j ^ d a y of November,
2001.
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ADDENDA
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UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

337

76-6-506

76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption.
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the
payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any
person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money property,
or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages,
salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a
bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check
PARTS
or draft for which payment is refused by the drawee is
presumed to know the check or draft would not be paid if he
FRAUD
had no account with the drawee at the time of issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the
T6-6-501. F o r g e r y — "Writing" defined.
. 1 • A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any
person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property,
anvone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be
or other thing of value or paving for any services, wages,
perpetrated by anyone, he:
salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is
' a' alters any writing of another without his authority
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check
or utters any such altered writing; or
or draft if he fails to make good and actual payment to the
ib) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues,
payee in the amount of the refused check or draft within 14
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the
days of his receiving actual notice of the check or draft's
writing or the making, completion, execution, authenticanonpayment.
tion, issuance, transference, publication or utterance pur(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be
ports to be the act of another, whether the person is
punished as follows:
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than
made or drawn in this state within a period not exceeding
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no
six months amounts to a sum that is less than $300, the
such original existed.
offense is a class B misdemeanor.
• 2> As used in this section, "writing" includes printing,
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or
recording valuable information including forms such as:
drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six
months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $300 but is
i a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right,
privilege, or identification;
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or
drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six
lb) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument
months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $1,000 but is
or writing issued by a government or any agency; or
less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other
degree.
instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim

f die owner releases any fur-bearing animal raised for
^oimercial purposes is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
-I The Legislature finds that the release of fur-bearing
i r m a l s raised for commercial purposes subjects the animals
. > unnecessary suffering through deprivation of food and
^ r e ; r e r and compromises their genetic integrity, thereby permanently depriving the owner of substantial value.
1997

against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim
against any person or enterprise.
13) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
1996
76-6-502.

P o s s e s s i o n of f o r g e d w r i t i n g or d e v i c e for

writing.
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly possesses any writing that is a forgery as defined in Section
76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud knowingly possesses
any device for making any such writing, is guilty of a felony of
the third degree, except where the altering, making, completion, execution, issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of
such writing would constitute a class A misdemeanor, in which
event the possession of the writing or device for making such
a writing shall constitute a class A misdemeanor.
1974
76-6-503.
1

F r a u d u l e n t h a n d l i n g of r e c o r d a b l e w r i t i n g s .

1J Any person who with intent to deceive or injure anyone
falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any will, deed, mortgage, security instrument, or other writing for which the law
provides public recording is guilty of fraudulent handling of
recordable writings.
(

2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings is a felony of
the third degree.
1973
'6-6-504.
f

(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or
drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six
months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $5,000, the
offense is a second degree felony.
1995

Tampering with records.

1 > Any person who, having no privilege to do so, knowingly
salsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any writing, other
th
an the writings enumerated in Section 76-6-503, or record,
Public or private, with intent to deceive or injure any person or
t0
conceal any wrongdoing is guilty of tampering with records.
2> Tampering with records is a class B misdemeanor. 1973

76-6-506.

F i n a n c i a l transaction card offenses — Defi-

nitions.
For purposes of this part:
(1) *Authorized credit card merchant" means a person
as defined in Section 68-3-12 who is authorized by an
issuer to furnish money, goods, services, or anything else
of value upon presentation of a financial transaction card
by a card holder and to present valid credit card sales
drafts to the issuer for payment.
(2) "Automated banking device" means any machine
which, when properly activated by a financial transaction
card or a personal identification code, may be used for any
of the purposes for which a financial transaction card may
be used.
(3) "Card holder" means any person or organization
named on the face of a financial transaction card to whom
or for whose benefit a financial transaction card is issued
by an issuer.
(4) "Credit card sales draft" means any sales slip, draft,
or other written or electronic record of a sale of money,
goods, services, or anything else of value made or purported to be made to or at the request of a card holder with
a financial transaction card, financial transaction card
credit number, or personal identification code, whether
the record of the sale or purported sale is evidenced by a
sales draft, voucher, or other similar document in writing
or electronically recorded and transmitted.

FILED 5-//^oO
Founn Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

CARMA B. SMIJH, Clerk
T^

^Puty

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 991405202, 991405203
DATE: MAY 11, 2000

vs

JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS
AMBER BARRICK,
TRAVIS GLENN JOHNSTON,

CLERK: SGJ
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on Monday, May 8, 2000.
Matthew Jube, Deputy Utah County Attorney, appeared for the State of Utah. Defendants were
present and represented by Paul DeWitt of the Public Defender's OfiBce. Arguments were
entertained and one exhibit was received.
The Court opined, after hearing the arguments, that the more appropriate charge
appeared to be theft of lost or mislaid property under 76-6-407, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended. The Court then took the matter under advisement.
I.
FACTS
The following facts were stipulated to by counsel:
1.

The defendants, Amber Barrick and Travis Glenn Johnston, came into possession
of a money order made payable in the amount of $33.59. (See State's exhibit #1)
It is unclear how it came into possession of the defendants.

2.

The "Pay to the Order of line had been left blank. (State's exhibit #1)

3.

On its face, the money order bore the signature and address of the victim who had
purchased it evidently to pay a bill.

4.

The name Amber Barrick wasfilledin on the "Pay to the Order of" line. It was
endorsed by Amber Barrick on the back of the instrument, and presented for
payment. The defendants received $33.59.

5.

The victim is not acquainted with Amber Barrick or Travis Johnston. The victim

did not authorize or intend that any money be paid to either of them and was not
indebted to either defendant.

n.
DISCUSSION
Both Amber Barrick and Travis Johnston were charged with Forgery, a Third Degree
Felony. Under 76-6-501, a person is guilty of forgery i£ with purpose to defraud any he: 1) alters
any writing of another without authority or completes any writing so that writing or the
completion purports to be the act of another.
There is no case law in Utah which addresses the unique facts of this case. It is a close
case and certainly a court could rule either way with justification. Certainly Utah's Appellate
Courts could give guidance in this area.
It could be argued that byfillingin her name, Ms. Barrick completed a writing so that
writing or the completion purports to be the act of another; the purchaser or the legitimate payee.
On the other hand one can effectively argue that thefillingin of one's name on a bearer
instrument, by its very definition, cannot be forgery, unless there is an alteration or modification.
If Miss Barrick and Mr. Johnston presented the money order to afinancialinstitution,
without modifying the face of the document, there is no forgery. But that is not the case.
One, or both, of themfilledin the blank spaces (the name and the date) and Ms. Barrick
endorsed the money order. The purchaser did not authorize these defendants to do anything.
Without authority they completed the writing, purporting that that completion was the act of the
purchaser. By stipulation, the Court is aware that it was not the act of the purchaser/maker.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to place
these cases back on the calendar for waiver hearing. Counsel for the State is instructed to prepare
an order consistent with this decision.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NOS. 991405202
991405203

VS.
AMBER BARRICK,
TRAVIS GLENN JOHNSTON,

ORIGINAL

Defendants

BEFORE THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 NORTH 100 WEST
PROVO, UTAH 84601

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
ORAL ARGUMENTS
MAY 8, 2000

REPORTED BY:

Tasha Taylor, RPR, CSR

otoomozicA
Certified Court Transcript
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A P P E A R A N C E S
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FOR THE PLAINTIFF
MATTHEW P. JU3E
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 E. Center #2100
Provo, UT 84606

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
PAUL DEWITT
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
40 South 100 West #200
Provo, Utah 84601

Certified Court Transcript
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P r o v o , U t a h ; May 8, 2 00 0
P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's go back on the record on

Amber Barrick and Travis Glenn Johnston.
MR. JUBE:

Your Honor, on these cases we have a

little bit of a unique situation.

We really don't disagree

on the facts, at least the salient facts or material facts in
the case.

We have a difference of opinion as to whether or

not those facts constitute a forgery.

What we wanted to do,

with the Court's indulgence and permission, is proffer the
facts for you, and then make some arguments as brief as we
can as to why we think it is or is not forgery, and have you
decide whether it should be bound over.
THE COURT:
MR. JUBE:

Okay.
Since it's the State's case, we'll

proceed, if that's all right, and go forth and give our
proffer.
May I approach, Judge?
THE COURT:
MR. JUBE:

You may.
I just want to have this marked for

identification as State's Exhibit No. 1.
copy that the defense has.
That is a copy.

It's actually a

I'll present that to the Court.

There's a front and a back.

The first page

of that exhibit is the front of a money order and the second
page is the back of that money order.
Certified fnnr-t- T
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1

The facts in this case, in brief, are as follows:

I
2 I That on or about the date indicated in the Information,
3

November 13, 199S, through or between November 15, 1999, the

A

defendants in this case, Ms. Barrick and Mr. Johnston, came
across that money order that you see there here in Provo, in
Utah County, Utah.

They knew that the money order was not

theirs and knew that it had not been made out to them.

In

fact, the payee line as you see that has the name Amber
Barrick written on it did not have that name written on it
when they found it.
THE COURT:
MR. JUBE:

Did it have any name?
It had no name written on it and no

endorsement on the back.

What the defendants did, they were

short on money, they had recently been engaged to be married
or married.

At any rate, they were short on money and chose

together to fill that document in with the name Amber
Barrick, and then also to endorse it on the back and then
cash it, which they did here in Provo, Utah, County Utah.
Those are the basic facts.
really need to give you.

I think that's all we

Then if we can make a brief

argument or do you have any questions of us before we do
that?
THE COURT:

A money order is close to finding cash

on the ground, as if they found a $20 bill.
MR. JUBE:

It's close.

The State's position is that

Certified Court Transcript
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it's not the same, though.
THE COURT:
MR. JUBE:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Okay.

Do you want me to make a brief argument:?
Well, yeah.

Why don't you make brief

argument, first of all.
MR. JUBE:

Really, just the point I wanted to make,

Your Honor, is in the statute forgery is when you do one of a
number of things or maybe even more than one of a number of
things to a writing.

That is, you either complete it, you

alter it, you utter it, and you know the language in the
statute.

There's several options.
THE COURT:

To defraud anyone or acknowledge that

forgery was facilitating a fraud or perpetrated by anyone,
made, completed, executed, uttered a writing so that the
writing, making, completion, execution, or utterance
purported to be the act of another, if such writing was a
check.
MR. JUBE:

In this case, Your Honor, our position is

that the defendants found the check.

They had fraudulent

intent, obviously they knew -- not the check, the money -THE COURT:
MR. JUBE:

It's not a check.

It's a money order.

They knew the money order was not theirs,

did not belong to them, and was not made out to them.
THE COURT1:

That might meet the first element with

the purpose to defraud anyone.

Okay.

Keep going.
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MR. JUBE:

Then they completed -- arguably completed

that document, which is necessary in order to cash a money
order.

Albeit :: is close to what we might consider bearer

paper, it does have to at least have a payee on there.

The

State's position is that when the defendants found that, with
fraudulent intent, completed it in order to utter it and get
money for it.

That completion purported to be the act of

either a U.S. Bank or another lawful holder of that document.
However, that completion was not a lawful act of
either of those parties, either the bank or the person to
whom the bank lawfully gave that money order.

They could not

have cashed it had they not written in -- had they not gone
through the deception of writing in their names when it
didn't belong to them.

Basically whoever is cashing that

thinks that U.S. Bank made a money order out to Amber
Barrick, and U.S. Bank did not make a money order out to
Amber Barrick or -THE COURT:
anyone?

But did U.S. Bank make the money out to

They left the name in blank.
MR. JUBE:

But they did.

The person, the victim in

this case, actually went into the bank, paid cash, paid that
amount to get that money order.
THE COURT:
MR. JUBE:
a Sara Bishop.

It was hers.

Who is your victim?
The victim -- the name escapes me.

I spoke with her on the phone today.
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l| not here, obviously, because we agree with these facts.
There's a little bit of a disagreement as to how the
defendants came about the money order.

It's the victim's

opinion that they actually took it out of her mailbox because
she wasn't in Maceys, but I think it's their claim they found
it in a store in Maceys or somewhere.
At any rate, they knew it wasn't theirs when they
found it, and they used it with fraudulent intent.

So our

argument, Your Honor, is that when they fill out a name like
that on that check, it's purported to be the act of either
U.S. Bank or whoever lawfully held the money order initially.
When they take it unlawfully, with fraudulent intent, and
write their name in, they're purporting that someone else did
that lawfully, not themselves.
THE COURT:

Isn't it better characterized as a theft

as opposed to a forgery?
MR. JUBE:

It can be, but the main difference being

with theft, for example with cash, $20 bill, that's clearly
theft because nothing among the options in the forgery
statute need to be done to facilitate the fraud.
have to complete it.

You don't

You don't have to do anything to it,

but in this case you do.
And in layman's terms, our position is that when you
screw with the writing, when you have to do .something to the
writing to get it to work for you, to carry out your fraud,
Certified Court- Trpnarr-i r^t-
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you're committing forgery.
THE COURT:
MR. JURE:

Knowing that it does not belong to you.
Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

And that someone else actually is the

payor.
MR. JUBE:

Payee.

THE COURT:

Yeah.

That someone else is the payor --

I mean, someone has purchased it, and someone else is going
to be the payee.

It may or may not be that victim, because

she or he may be making this out, or anticipated making it
out to pay a bill or do something such as that.
MR. JUBE:

And just as -- I do know one of the

arguments to some of the materials that counsel for the
defense has, in Am. Jur. and other works, indicates that a
forgery is something where whatever is done to the document
changes the legal significance, arguing that there are some
things you can do to a writing that really wouldn't change
its legal significance.
Our argument would be that in this case, obviously
changing a different payee, when it was meant to be the
victim or U.S. West who she was going to send the bill to, is
changing the legal significance of that document, and
diverting the funds from the lawful payee to now the
defendants.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Dewitt.
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MR. DEWITT:

Well, I think, Your Honor, seeing the

problem here, first off, we would argue that as you have
stated that under the UCC this is a negotiable instrument.
It is, in fact, payable to bearer.
Under the UCC, Section 3-109, states that -- under
the heading, "Payable to Bearer or to Order," it states:
"(1) A promise or order is payable to bearer if it:
(a) states that it is payable to bearer or to the
order of bearer or otherwise indicates that the person in
possession of the promise or order is entitled to payment;
(b) does not state a payee."
Which is the case in this case before the Court
today.

And that was further expressed by the Utah Supreme

Court in State v. Donaldson, which for the record is
385 P.2d 151.

When the Court said, "It is well" -- and

they're quoting from Am. Jur. as well -- "It is well settled
by authority that the omission to insert in an instrument the
name of a payee is not a feature or a defect which affects
negotiability.

The effect of the omission to name a payee is

to invest any bona fide holder with the authority to fill in
the blank left for that purpose by the drawer or maker."
THE COURT:
MR. DEWITT:

Got to be bona fide.
Well, absolutely.

that they're bona fide.

We're not stating

We're stating that by adding that,

it does not change the legal significant of the writing.
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"Such instruments are payable to the bearer until

2 | restricted in their currency as negotiable instruments by the
3

insertion of the name of some particular payee."

4 '

In other words, when the victim here got a money

5 , order, she paid the money for it.
6 j her.

She had it placed before

At that point she signs, as the Court can see, she

i

7 J signs her name and address to that document, she has the
option at that time to limit that instrument as to who can
and who cannot negotiate it.

She choose for whatever reason

not to.
And my mother who is in court today taught me a long
time ago, when you write a check, you better make sure you
fill it out, or you risk the chance that you're going to lose
that, and it does become a bearer instrument.

At the time

they -found it and presented it, what they did was sign their
own name, and the one part of the statute that hasn't been
addressed clearly is the act of another.

What they did was

put in Amber's name as her own, and by negotiating on the
back of it, she actually did nothing to change the legal
significance of that document.
That was then presented to a holder in due course
who put another representation on it.

Could have taken it

and given it to somebody else, and they could have taken that
instrument and negotiated for cash somewhere else.

It's a

well settled fact that once you endorse a check, it becomes a
Certified Court Transcript
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bearer instrument.

And many times I've written checks to the

grocery store, it comes back with three or four endorsements
down the chain.
The thing that we're concerned about is that under
the State's theory, if I take a check and I were to present
it to counsel, and I filled it out, and I said, "Matt, I'm
going to give you this check.
the line blank.

Fill it in.

I'll give you $25.

I've left

But the one thing I do not want

you to do is you can not give it to Gunda under any
circumstances.

That is not for her to have."

And he goes ahead and signs it, endorses it, and
gives it to her.

It could, under this same theory, become

forgery because it's my subjective intent that makes it
forgery.

Her subjective intent was to give it to U.S. West

or pay an electric bill.
THE COURT:

The victims in this case --

They don't want to give it to Amber

Barrick.
MR. DEWITT:

Absolutely, they did not.

And there's

a number of cases, Your Honor, I would point out that -- and
I really don't want to take a lot of the Court's time, but
Professors Lefave and Scott in Substantive Criminal Law
pointed out that forgery, as they put it, forgery like false
pretense requires a lie, which is her saying that it's my
check.

It might be a lie about the document itself.

must relate to the genuineness of the document.
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In Am. Jur. they state, "An instrument so altered

2 | that it is not the instrument signed by the maker, and if
3

this is fraudulently and falsely done, it is forgery.

4

Similarly, if words are added to change the effect of the
i

5

instrument with like intent, the crime of forgery is

6 1 committed.

Any change in an instrument which alters it's

legal effect makes it speak in a substantial matter in
different legal language and wherein any obligation is
increased, diminished, or discharged is a forgery.

But any

immaterial change which even if true will not effect the
legal liability of the parties in an action on the instrument
does not generally amount to forgery. ,f
There's a number of cases that are on point, they're
from the Tenth Circuit, none from Utah that are right on
point, that suggest that when you write your own name on a
document and don't change the legal effect of the document,
something about the document must be false then, after you've
made that change.

What we're saying is, we're arguing, as

the Court's pointed out, they found something that was not
theirs.
And when you find, as you pointed, you find a $20
bill, and you pick it up, have you broken the theft laws in
Utah?

Well, you can certainly argue that misplaced property,

theft of misplaced property, however, to convict somebody of
forgery, our point is that you must fulfill all the elements.
Certified Court Transcript
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And in this case, the State cannot fulfill all the elements,
because the only act done did not change the legal
significance of the document, did not change the legal
liability of any of the parties to the document.
The only act done was by the people themselves using
their own name.

And when they were through, when they had

passed it on, nothing had changed in that document.
person could take it.

The next

Somebody could have slipped that out

of the pile, some clerk, gone somewhere else and cashed it.
Signed their name on the back.

And it would -- again, we

don't have forgery, we have another theft.

And it would just

go on ad infinitum, but not forgery, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. JUBE:

Okay.
Can I have a short rebuttal?

THE COURT:
MR. JUBE:

Sure.
Just briefly to answer a couple of

counsel's points.
THE COURT:

It reminds me of the time I found a $20

bill in Albertsons down here on Fifth West.
had to drop it in the store.

I knew somebody

I must have gone to 25 people

or so, I had a $20 bill in my hand, and said, "Did you drop
this $2 0 bill?"

I never could find anybody.

MR. JUBE:

It's an important analogy, actually,

because in the case of a 20, number one, it's more difficult
to find whose it is.

In this case, there's U.S. Bank written

Certified Court Transrrinf

a

There's tracking numbers, 12 numbers, it

lj

on the money order.

2

would have been very easy to find out.

3;

THE COURT:

Why doesn't it rise to the theft cf

4 I misplaced property, misplaced or lost property?

What it is,

it was either stolen from the mailbox, or it was found in
some location, but it wasn't meant for them.
MR. JUBE:

The main difference is that in the case

such as this with a money order, or a blank check, cashier's
check, a non-cashier's check where the payee is left blank,
is that when someone chooses to complete it, alter it, do any
one of those options to the check in order to get the funds
for themselves, that's what forgery is.

It's where you have

a writing that represents value, but you can't extract the
value out of it before you do something to it.
Otherwise, the bank will just say, "Wait a minute.
This isn't your signature," or, "this isn't made out to you,
we can't cash this," or a many number of options.

When they

chose to do one of those things to the writing, they're
purporting that the U.S. Bank really in effect did that, or
that whoever U.S. Bank gave the money order to lawfully did
that for them.

They're purporting that it was lawfully

transferred to them by someone when it was not.
I disagree with the fact that this was not -- this
did not legally change the significance.

Words were added

that did change the effect of this money order.
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of being able to be sent to U.S. West, which is what the
victim wanted originally, when it sat in her mailbox, now
money was paid $33.59 to the defendants instead.

That

changes the legal effect of the document and effects
liability.
Now, she's liable, the victim, Ms. Bishop, for a
bill to U.S. West, which they say she didn't pay.

She's out

$33.59 for money that she did pay out of her pocket for the
money order and it is now in the defendants' pocket.
there is one other point I wanted to make.

I think

There is a

difference in this case between the issues of what you can do
and what you can do legally.
I think counsel's mother's advice, for example, is
very apt and appropriate that you need to fill things in or
you run the risk of the defendant or a wrongdoer being able
to get money from you somehow, fooling the bank or whoever
else by filling in their name.

But it doesn't mean that if

they do that, they do it illegally and walk away without
punishment.

It just means they're able to get away with it.

So to protect ourselves we should fill in checks and money
orders completely.

But the fact that we don't, doesn't give

defendants the right to commit the crimes of forgery and
others with those writings.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, I have to tell you that in

the last 13 years on the bench, I've not been presented with
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this issue.

If it's payable to bearer and it is left blank,

I don't know that it constitutes a forgery.

It may

constitute seme type of theft of misplaced property, but I'm
going to read the case 385 P.2d 151, or have a noble law
clerk do the same, and make a determination as it relates to
the law.
property.

My impression is that it's theft of misplaced
I'll take it under advisement, counsel.
MR. JUBE:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Judge.
In light of that we won't have to

proceed with the preliminary hearing until such time as the
Court makes some initial threshold determination legally.
MR. DEWITT:

Just to inform the Court, what our

plans are is that if you decide that, either way, they will
go ahead -- my clients have already stated that they'll go
ahead and plead.
I would like to point out for the record as well, I
wanted to give Mr. Jube a pat on the back because quite often
in these kind of cases we had a disagreement, and in my
limited experience, I've noticed it tends to become, "Well,
here's your deal, but if you make this legal argument, we're
going to hold you -- I could make it a felony."
a misdemeanor on this.

He's offered

He's offered to keep that open

through the preliminary so that we could argue it because we
weren't sure.
MR. JUBE:

I was sure.

Counsel wasn't.
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MR. DEWITT:

He's right.

He was sure, but then I

went and did the research to become sure.
THE COURT:

He didn't raise it to a capital case if

you don't take the -MR. DEWITT:

That's right, and I just wanted to get

on the record that I appreciated that, and we will plead
either way that the Court decides.

And both of us have said

we'll probably come up with -- if we win, he might appeal,
and if he wins we're going to do a sery plea.
THE COURT:

You might as well make case law in the

State of Utah as it relates to bearer paper.
MR. DEWITT:

It's an interesting case, so, thank

you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

(Proceedings in the above-entitled matter were
concluded.)
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